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REREADING FEAR AND TREMBLING
Earl McLane

This paper offers a rereading of Kierkegaard's Fear and Trembling in the
light of the Edifying Discourses that accompanied it. Such a rereading serves
to mitigate the picture of God that one may initially receive from the workthe picture of God as a 'capricious despot.' While Fear and Trembling does
contain a "divine command" ethic, it is an ethic based on the thesis that God
is love-an ethic expressed in the Biblical injunction: 'You shall love the
Lord your God with all your heart, and with all your soul, and with all your
mind. [And] you shall love your neighbor as yourself' (Matt. 22:37-39). Such
a religious ethic may still require a 'teleological suspension of the ethical.'
Abraham provides an illustration of such a suspension because he believed
that he was called upon to sacrifice his son. However, in the light of
Kierkegaard's "subjectivity is truth" thesis, God need not be seen as in fact
issuing such a command. Such a non-literal rereading, it is argued, is more
consistent with the emphasis on the unchangeableness of God-a constant
theme of the religious discourses.

It is perhaps unfortunate that many begin-and end-their read-ing of
Kierkegaard with Fear and Trembling. The story of Abraham-of his willingness to raise the knife over his son in obedience to the divine commandhas made him the father of faith to Jews, Christians, and Muslims. To others,
however, Abraham remains an object of horror. Likewise, while many have
found inspiration in Kierkegaard's retelling of the story, others have found
the fact that he would seriously concern himself with such a tale to be itself
horrifying. Milic Capek writes: "It is ... discouraging to see Kierkegaard ... admiring this story in its crude and primitive form and thus sacrificing the moral
qualities of God to his alleged omnipotence."! He finds in Kierkegaard " ... the
idea of a despotic God whose capricious and arbitrary will makes and unmakes the moral law and who insists on absolute slavish obedience on the
part of man."2 According to Capek, such a view of God is due to the influence
of Luther-and further back to that of Scotus and Ockham. Even sympathetic
interpreters of Kierkegaard agree that such a picture of God can be found in
Fear and Trembling. D. Z. Phillips, for example, writes: "There [i.e., in Fear
and Trembling], Kierkegaard speaks as if one can understand God's commands simply by saying that God commanded them. One could say 'God
commands X' where 'X' could be any given value whatever."3
Whether such a picture of God, with its corollary of faith as blind obedience, is to be taken as Kierkegaard's own is crucial to determining the charFAITH AND PHILOSOPHY
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acter of his religious thought. 4 There are, of course, ways of dissociating
Kierkegaard from such a picture. The work is, after all, by a pseudonym-and
we have Kierkegaard's own word that the views of the pseudonyms are not
to be identified with his own.s Further, the use of a pseudonym named Johannes de Silentio (John of Silence) and, therefore, a recurring emphasis on
silence, along with the motto from Hamann all suggest that the message
conveyed by the book will be a hidden one. 6 Again, Abraham is an Old
Testament figure who, from the standpoint of Christianity, would represent a
limited conception of God and faith.7 There is also the obvious polemical
character of the book.s
Something can be said in behalf of each of these points. One cannot,
therefore, identify what Johannes has to say about faith with Kierkegaard's
own position. On the other hand, to view the book as fundamentally ironic,
as some have done 9 , may lead one to overlook the element of seriousness and
the fact that the book does tell us something about Kierkegaard's own views.
It is clear that Kierkegaard saw some analogy between his own case and that
of Abraham. While he was writing Fear and Trembling, it seems that he was
pondering the possibility that as Abraham-after giving up Isaac-had received him back through faith so might he, in a similar fashion, get Regine
back. Indeed he writes in his Journal at this time: "If I had had faith, I would
have stayed with Regine" (JP, 5, #5664.)10 He would also agree with Johannes
that there are "teleological suspensions of the ethical." He writes in his
Journal:
I am a poet. But long before I became a poet I was intended for the life of
religious individuality. And the event whereby I became a poet was an ethical
break or a teleological suspension of the ethical. And both of these things
made me want to become something more than the poet. (JP, 6, #6718.)

The difficulty arises in saying just what is involved in such a suspension.
Some have seen such a claim as directed primarily against a moral position
such as Kant's-i.e. as insisting that there are exceptions to a morality based
on universal or general rules. 11 Others have contended that the focus of the
book is on an Hegelian conception of the ethical. 12 That such would seem to
be the case is indicated by the fact that the ethical is characterized in terms
of "social morality" (Saedelighed)-as well as the fact that most of the
quotations are drawn from Hegel (See, e.g., FT, 54-5, 68-9, 82.) The "ethical"
is characterized as "the universal" and the ethical task of the individual is
to-" ... continually express himself in this, to annul his singularity in order
to become the universal" (FT, 54). Also, after introducing each of the three
problems with a characterization of the "ethical" and its requirements, we
find it repeated that if such a characterization is correct, then Hegel is rightand Abraham is a murderer and unjustified in keeping silent (FT, 54, 68, 82.)
There is also the interesting irony that the sacrifice of a child on the altar of
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the State is considered, contrary to Kant, ethically justifiable. 13 Hence, the
"ethical" that is to be "suspended" seems primarily to be that of Hegel-die
Sittlichkeit. It would also seem, however, that he-and Kierkegaard-also
have Kant in mind. Despite the many affinities of what Kierkegaard has to
say about the "ethical" with the views of Kant as well as his admiration for
him, he is clearly at odds with Kant on the issue of autonomy.14 This difference is clearly reflected in Kant's well-known reaction to the Abraham story.
In his Der Streit der Fakultiiten, Kant says:
Abraham should have replied to this primitive divine voice: 'That I may not
kill my good son is absolutely certain. But that you who appear to me are
God is not certain, even though the voice were to sound from the very
heavens ... For that a voice which one seems to hear cannot be divine one can
be certain of...in case what is commanded is contrary to the moral law.
However majestic or supernatural it may appear to be, one must regard it as
a deception. IS
Against Kant, Kierkegaard insists that there are exceptions. Against Hegel,
he insists that if faith is to be a reality, there must be a place for the individual
"beyond" the realm of morality as Sittlichkeit. Against both, he is concerned
to show the inadequacy of any purely rational conception of morality that
leaves no room for faith as a personal relation of the individual to GOd. 16
Both in effect leave God "out of the picture."
Yet to insist on keeping God in the picture, as well as on the possibility of
a "teleological suspension of the ethical," on the possibility of a conflict of
one's religious duty with one's ethical duty, is this not to identify oneself with
the picture of God described earlier? Must this, then, be taken as
Kierkegaard's own view? My proposal is that we should look again at Fear
and Trembling, particularly taking into account what he has to say elsewhere
but especially in the Edifying Discourses that accompanied the publication
of the work. That is to say, we should take seriously his statement that he
was a "religious writer" from the beginning of his authorship.17
A central theme of these discourses is love. In fact, we find here many of
the points that are developed later in the Works of Love, a book often regarded
as isolated from the mainstream of the authorship. Two of them are on the
topic "Love Shall Cover a Multitude of Sins." They offer, in effect, a characterization of Christian love. Such love is said not to be found in paganism.
While such love is to some extent present in Judaism, the latter is also said
to be lacking. "For the pious Jew also bore witness to love, but this love was
the child of mutability and change, and he knew how to hate the enemy. He
even ascribed vengeance to the Lord because he himself had it. ... "18 By
contrast, regarding Christian love it is said:
And only this is love which never becomes something else, this which gives
everything and because of this, demands nothing, this which demands noth-
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ing, and therefore has nothing to lose, this which blesses, and blesses when
it is cursed, this which loves its neighbor, but whose enemy is also his neighbor,
this which leaves vengeance to the Lord, because it comforts him to believe that
the Lord is even more merciful than he himself is. (ED DISC, I, 63.)
This discourse goes on to cite Jesus' injunction that we are to 'turn the other
cheek' and that we are to 'forgive seventy times seven' (ED DISC, I, 72).
Throughout, God is depicted as unchanging love. The image is recalled of
the father of the prodigal son who stands with open arms and awaits the erring
(ED DISC, I, 76-77.)
The second discourse on this theme notes how the Apostle Peter, even
though the end of things is said to be at hand, nevertheless, admonished the
early Christians to love their neighbor even in the minor relations of life (ED
DISC, I, 81.) The discourse speaks also to us, for everyone must die and come
to judgment (ED DISC, I, 82.) Love, however, can prepare us for judgment
(ED DISC, I, 82.) For such love can also uncover our own multiplicity of
sins (ED DISC, I, 84.) The discourse closes with the story of a fallen woman
who appeared uninvited at a dinner party for Jesus held at the home of a
Pharisee. The woman washed Jesus' feet with her tears, dried them with her
hair, kissed them, and anointed them. Her many sins stood revealed before
all. Her tears of repentance turned to tears of worship. But then, as she knelt
weeping at Jesus' feet,
Then love discovered what the world hid-the love within her; and since it
had not triumphed in her, the Savior's love came to help, so that he 'to whom
five hundred pennies were forgiven, must love most; and He made the love
in her even more powerful in hiding the multitude of sins, the love which
was already there for 'her many sins were forgiven her, because she loved
much.' (ED DISC, I, 90.)
Such a love-a love that is said to be beyond all understanding, even foolishness to the understanding-can come to the aid of our love, drive out the
fear, and conceal a multitude of sins (ED DISC, I, 89.)
The subject of the third discourse, "Strengthened in the Inner Man," is faith,
the topic of the two discourses that had earlier accompanied Either/Or. The
Scripture text is taken from the third chapter of Ephesians in which Paul,
writing from his prison at Rome, prays that his followers may be strengthened
with might by God's Spirit, that Christ might dwell in their hearts by faith,
that they might be rooted and grounded in love. He is concerned that they
might be offended at his sufferings, that they might lose heart and abandon
the teaching, a teaching that he believed had been communicated to him by
a special revelation (ED DISC, I, 94-96.) Paul, however, transformed his
suffering into a testimony for his teaching. Indeed, "Even if afflicted, yet he
was always joyful; even though poor, he always made many rich; even though
he had nothing, he still possessed everything" (ED DISC, I, 96.) Through
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such inner strengthening, through such faith, Paul was able to give thanks
always.
Such strengthening, such faith, cannot come through knowledge of the
world. Knowledge is indifferent in its relation to the world, and its testimony
is always ambiguous (ED DISC, I, 100-102.) Faith is not acquired by "collecting evidence." As he says in an earlier discourse, to expect something
special, something particular, is to lack faith (ED DISC, I, 31.)
But if he is truly concerned, then will everything through God serve for the
strengthening in the inner man; for God is faithful and does not leave Himself
without testimony. But God is Spirit, and therefore can give only spiritual
testimony, that is in the inner man; every external testimony from God, if
one could imagine such a thing, is only a deception. (ED DISC, I, 103.)
Through faith, which can be had only through being constantly acquired, one
comes to realize that every gift is a good and perfect gift (ED DISC, I, 35ff.)
Whatever happens, if it is received with humility and thankfulness, can serve
for strengthening in the inner man (ED DISC, I, 106; 45-47.) Indeed, such a
believer comes to see that his faith and his thankfulness are themselves gifts
(ED DISC, I, 116.) The conviction that God is love gives rise to a love born
of repentance. Such a believer can, as it were, let the whole world go and
can then receive it back again as a gift from God, as from a loving father.
Only then can he truly have the world, rather than the world having him (ED
DISC, I, 21-22.)
In summary, we find in these discourses the view that God is love and that
faith is a trust in this love. That such love can reveal to us our sins and hence
call us to repentance. That such love demands of us not only that we love
God in return, but that we love our neighbor as well. That such love calls us
in effect to give up the world that we might receive it back again as a gift.
That such love is revealed in Jesus, in his life and in his "covering" or
forgiving of sins. It is true that the words 'paradox' and 'offence' are not used
with reference to Jesus, though the love that he exemplifies is said to be
"folly" to the understanding. Nevertheless the two stories of Jesus' "covering"
of sins must certainly call to mind the fact that the Pharisiees were "offended"
that he would forgive sins-for only God can forgive sins.
Such a "picture" of God stands in sharp contrast with the one that appears
in Fear and Trembling. However, let us read again-keeping in mind what
Kierkegaard has given us with his "right hand."19 We are now more likely to
see that Abraham's faith is not just an occasional response to an 'absurd'
divine command. Nor was this the first time that he had been called upon to
"suspend the ethical."20 Johannes, in his eulogy of Abraham, emphasizes that
it was by faith that Abraham left his father and emigrated to another land, by
faith that he received the promise that in his seed all the generations of the
earth would be blessed, by faith that he held to this promise far beyond the
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time that Sarah could be supposed to have children (FT, 17.) He had fought
with time and had kept the faith (FT, 19.) His faith is exemplified in a life
of trust. According to Stephen Evans, it is this trust that provides the "interpretative framework" that leads Abraham to conclude, appearances to the
contrary, that his act is the right one. Evans contends:
Abraham's trust was faith in the truest sense of the word. Though perhaps
grounded in his experience of God it was by no means a belief to be treated
as an experimental hypothesis, but a conviction to be clung to through thick
and thin. 21
Through his trial, Abraham is depicted as maintaining his trust in God's
promise, his trust that somehow, though it may appear absurd-especially to
a non-believer like Johannes-he will get Isaac back.
His trust is also seen as an expression of his love for God. According to
Johannes, the notion of an absolute duty to God is characterized in terms of
God's demand for absolute love (FT, 72-73.) Yet, it is also Abraham's duty
to love Isaac.
He must love Isaac with his whole soul. Since God claims Isaac, he must, if
possible, love him even more, and only then can he sacrifice him, for it is
indeed this love for Isaac that makes his act a sacrifice by its paradoxical
contrast to his love for God. (FT, 74.)
As he says elsewhere, such an absolute duty may require one to embody a
paradoxical expression of the ethical, " ... such as, for example, that love to
God may bring the knight of faith to give his love to the neighbor-an
expression opposite to that which, ethically speaking, is duty" (FT, 70.) Thus,
though it may not appear so to the understanding, Abraham's action can be
seen as falling under the Royal Law: 'You shall love the Lord your God with
all your heart, and with all your soul, and with all your mind. This is the great
and first commandment. And a second is like it, you shall love your neighbor
as yourself' (Matthew 22:37-39.) Is this not the "ethic" that we have found
in the Discourses? Yet, the love called for there was Christian love. Does
such a possibility appear in Fear and Trembling? Johannes does speak of a
more fearful "teleological suspension of the ethical" than that faced by Abraham. His comments occur in the context of the story of Agnes and the Merman. He tells us:
In sin, the single individual is already higher ... than the universal, because it
is a contradiction on the part of the universal to want to demand itself from
the person who lacks the conditio sine qua non .. . An ethics that ignores sin
is a completely futile discipline, but if it affirms sin, then it has eo ipso
exceeded itself. (FT, 98-99.)
He adds in a footnote: "As soon as sin emerges, ethics founders precisely on
repentance; for repentance is the highest ethical expression, but precisely as
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such it is the deepest ethical self-contradiction" (FT, 98n.) Is it not likely that
a Lutheran reading this passage would call to mind the image of the Law and
the Gospel? Are we not indirectly referred here to an "ethical" that does not
ignore sin-an ethic that also provides a means of "covering" sin?22 Ronald
Green has urged that it is in this passage regarding sin and repentance that
we find the "key" to deciphering Fear and Trembling. It contains not only
the "secret message" regarding faith but also reveals, at least partially,
Kierkegaard's own secret. He does not deny that the book was also directed
to Regine, to convey to her why he could not marry her, why she had to be
'sacrificed.' But this "message" is too obvious and too much concerned with
Kierkegaard's own situation to be the real "message."23 In contrast to Abraham,
who is seen as righteous, Kierkegaard saw himself as guilty: indeed he was
laboring under a tremendous burden of guilt and melancholy, both personal
and familial. According to Green:
It was partly because of the burden of this sin ... that he believed himself

unable to go through with the marriage: fearful, perhaps, that his melancholy
disposition, which was itself one consequence of this tradition of familial sin,
would ruin young Regine's life and make a happy union impossible. But the
issue of sin in Kierkegaard's thought and life transcended this one preoccupation in his writing. It is this issue, I believe, that constitutes the 'hidden
message' of this book.24

Green sees Kierkegaard as drawing here the consequences of Kant's analysis
of evil in his Religion within the Limits of Reason Alone, consequences that
Kant did not draw because of his 'enlightenment' presuppositions, consequences that were the same as those drawn by Paul, Augustine, and Luther
regarding the human condition. 25 He goes on to say:
Ethics must not be the highest possibility of human existence, as Kant in his
most optimistic moods wanted to believe. It must instead be transcended by
a more ultimate possibility in which forgiveness and the suspension of merited punishment become realities. In short, it must be possible for there to be
a 'teleological suspension of the ethical.' 26

For Green, it is this teleological suspension of the ethical, rather than that in
which a divine command suspends the ethical as the universal, which is the
key to the book. For without this suspension, we are all 'lost,' even Abraham.
Thus, for him, it is the issue of sin and grace, rather than the issue of divine
command morality that is the central focus of the bookY
I tend to agree almost entirely with Green. On the obstacles to marriage,
Kierkegaard tells us: "A penitent such as I was, my vita ante acta, my melancholy, that was enough."28 The problem of sin and the "teleological suspension" that Green emphasizes, the "suspension" of being unable to realize
the demands of the ethical, is central. Indeed, the verdict on ethics had already
been pronounced in the "ultimatum" attached to Either/Or. On the other hand,
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the issue of divine command morality is also central to the book. The only
question is the character of such a morality. There is implicit, we have said,
in Fear and Trembling an ethic of "agapism," an ethic based on the Royal
Law, an ethic that points forward to the Works of Love where Christianity is
called the "true ethic."29 It is our duty to love our neighbor and God (FT, 68.)
The basis of such a 'thou shalt' is that God himself is love. Those who raise
the possibility that such a "commander" could be a capricious despot forget
this "is." Kierkegaard is convinced, as is Johannes, that God is love (FT, 34.)
As Jeremy Walker has said: "For SK, as for all orthodox Christians, God's
will is his love-his love is his will."30 In this sense, Kierkegaard's view does
not seem to be subject to the usual objections to the divine command theory.
God's commands flow from his nature. Further, we are to love God because
He first loved us. As Phillips has put it: "To understand what it means to
believe in [such a] God is to understand why God must be obeyed."3l
Thus, in a sense, Abraham's "suspension of the ethical" could be seen as
a suspension of a lower "ethical" by a higher "ethical." For this reason, some
interpreters of Kierkegaard see his position as involving an extension of the
ethical rather than an abrogation of it. 32 One may do this as long as one
realizes that his position and the Kantian-Hegelian conception represent also
conflicting conceptions of the ethical. Whereas for Kant one gets one's "orders" from Reason, from oneself, and for Hegel from one's position in society,
Abraham takes his "orders" as an individual from God. Yet, that there is a
connection between these two kinds of duties, one's "ethical" duty and the
"will of God," is indicated by another passage in the Journals: "The terrifying
thing in the collision is that; that it is not a collision between God's command
and man's command but between God's command and God's command" (JP,
1, #908.) The conflict between the ethical and the religious is thus, in some
sense, a religious conflict. Thus, perhaps it would be better to speak of
Abraham's situation as involving a "teleological suspension of the religious"
by the religious. 33 On this view, Abraham's action would involve a belief that
a more general divine command had been "suspended" or overridden by a
special divine command directed to him as an individuaJ.34 Interestingly
enough, this is just the interpretation that Scotus places upon the situation.
For St. Thomas, though God might command an act "contrary to the wonted
mode of virtue," as in the case of Abraham, such a command did not involve
any suspension or dispensation of the natural law or of the fifth commandment. The command is only an exceptional expression of God's supreme
dominion over alllife. 35 On the other hand, in his response, the Subtle Doctor
distinguishes between the natural law understood in a strict sense and in a
broad sense. 36 It is only as understood in the strict sense that he agrees with
St. Thomas that God cannot dispense with a commandment of the natural
law. Only the commandments of the first table, those dealing with duties to
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God, meet this strict criterion. God, being Love, cannot command others to
hate Him. He cannot issue a self-contradictory command. Scotus argues,
however, that the precepts of the second table, those dealing with duties to
others, belong to the natural law only in a broad sense. They cannot be
deduced from the requirement that we must love God, nor from the commandment that we must love our neighbor. God, therefore, can issue a dispensation, or suspend these commandments, as He did in the case of
Abraham. Scotus thus admits an element of contingency with regard to these
commandments that is not admitted by St. Thomas. It is this element of
contingency, of course, that led to the "despotic" interpretation cited earlier.
Interpreters of Scotus have rightly challenged such an interpretation. God's
commands follow from his nature, which is love. It is true that the basis of
such contingency is God's liberty, that He is determined by nothing other
than Himself. As Efrem Bettoni says: "To say that for Duns Scotus the basis
of morality is the will of God is by no means incorrect. But care should be
taken not to confuse this will with caprice or arbitrariness. It should rather
be understood as that kind of will whereby God est rationabilissime et ordinatissime volens."37 Thus, God wills in a "most reasonable and orderly manner." Hence while Capek may be correct in linking Kierkegaard with Scotus,
it would seem that he is wrong in speaking of the "Scotist-Kierkegaardian
claim that God is beyond good and evil."38
There are, however, some points on which his position differs from that of
Scotus. The latter followed most other theologians in contending that Abraham
was justified in acting as he did because he was certain that the command
came from God. Some have seen Kierkegaard as advocating such a view. 39
It is true that Johannes does say of Abraham: "But he did not doubt, he did
not look in anguish to the left and to the right, he did not challenge heaven
with his prayers. He knew that it was God the almighty who was testing
him ... " (FT, 22.) This passage occurs in Johannes' eulogy of Abraham. Johannes presents a highly idealized and poetized picture of Abraham. As the
father of faith, it would not be appropriate to depict him as irresolute and
dOUbting. (The Bible does not.) On the other hand, it is difficult to reconcile
the view of Abraham as certain with what he says elsewhere about the anguish
of Abraham (FT, 52.) Whatever the view of Johannes, it is clear from what
Kierkegaard says elsewhere that faith always involves an element of "objective uncertainty." God being who He is, it seems that the possibility of an
immediate relation is ruled out. For that reason, most interpreters contend
that Abraham, while he may be resolute, cannot be certain that the command
comes from God. 40
The other point of difference arises over what might be called Kierkegaard's
"individualism." One of the recurrent themes of Fear and Trembling is that
the individual must discover for himself what it is that God requires of him.
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As Johannes de Silentio puts it, "Only the single individual can ever give
himself a more explicit explanation of what is to be understood by Isaac"
(FT, 71.) Kierkegaard came to believe that the task required of him demanded
that he live outside the "universal." Such is not required of everyone. As
Johannes sees it, people are assigned different tasks and the single individual
may find his task within the universal (FT, 75-76.) Indeed, it seems that this
is where most of us will find what Kierkegaard calls in Purity of Heart our
"eternal vocation."41 On the other hand, the Royal Law, as he says later in
the Works of Love, may demand the sacrifice of particular love-relationships
such as that between man and wife. 42 Again, it is a matter between the
individual and God. He writes there:
Moreover, if it were not a fact that one man, honest, sincere, respectable and
God-fearing, can under the same circumstances do exactly the opposite of
what another man does, who is also honest, sincere, respectable and Godfearing; then the God-relationship would not essentially exist, not in its most
profound significance. If one were able with absolute truth to judge every
man according to a common pattern, then would the God-relationship be
essentially abolished; then would everything face outward, heathenishly finding its complete expression in the state and community life ... 43

Kierkegaard's position is connected with the Pauline conception of love as
the fulfillment of the law. 44 As problematic and anxiety-provoking as it may
be, it is the task of the individual to decide for him or herself-in "fear and
trembling"-what Love requires of them.
This brings us back, however, to the disturbing figure of Abraham. Although we have altered the picture of God, we still have the question, indeed
it is all the more insistent now, how could God command Abraham to sacrifice
his son? How could such an action be an expression of love of God and
neighbor? How could "faith" sanction such a barbaric act? It must be admitted
that many Christian thinkers as well as Jewish thinkers have believed that
God did issue such a command. 45 After all, the Bible says He did. Indeed,
until the nineteenth century and the advent of Biblical criticism, this was the
"received" view. Abraham is depicted as believing that God had the right to
issue such a command. He does not plead his cause-or the cause of his
innocent son-as he did the cause of the citizens of Sodom and Gomorrah
(FT, 21.) It must also be admitted that Kierkegaard himself may have belonged to this group of believers. Like them, he sees God as the Lord and
giver of life; what God gives He can take back. The movement of infinite
resignation requires that one be willing to give up, to sacrifice, everything.
Still, to take the knife to one's own son?
A traditional way of mitigating the difficulty is, of course, to insist that
God did not really command Abraham to sacrifice Isaac. He may have told
him to carry out the act, but He did not intend for him to do it. This inter-
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pretation very early became a part of the Jewish tradition. As Shalom Spiegel
points out:
To be sure, the Talmudic Sages never wearied of repeating once and again
what occurs again and once again in the Prophets: 'Which I commanded not,
nor spoke it, neither came it into My mind.' (Jer. 19:5)-1 did not command
Jephthah to sacrifice his daughter, 1 did not speak to the king of Moab
(saying) that he should sacrifice his son, neither came it into My mind to ten
Abraham to slay his son ... 46

It is emphasized that, after all, Abraham did not sacrifice Isaac; the whole
affair was only a test. Is this not clearly indicated by the first verse of the
chapter, 'And God tested Abraham .. .'? Johannes is himself willing to grant
this point, provided that we remember that Abraham did not know that it was
a test. Again, he is willing to admit that the story ends happily; Abraham does
get Isaac back, but only after he has walked the lonely and terrifying path up
Mt. Moriah.
As a "master of irony" no doubt such a reading could have appealed to
Kierkegaard. There are, however, serious difficulties with such an interpretation. Why subject Abraham to such a cruel test? Johannes himself asks,
Who is this who seizes the staff from the old man, who is this who demands
that he himself shan break it! ... Is there no sympathy for this venerable old
man, none for the innocent child? And yet Abraham was God's chosen one,
and it was the Lord who imposed the ordeal [Provelse]. (FT, 19)

To say that God wanted to 'know' whether Abraham would pass the test, as
seems to be indicated by the passage 'Now I know ... ,' does not square with
the belief in God's omniscience. The traditional response is that the test is
imposed so that Abraham might show himself worthy of the promise and that
he might serve as an example of faith. Still, such an approach seems to make
God a dissembler whose "commands" may not reflect his true will. Also,
while such an interpretation shifts the emphasis of the story to the second
command, it does not eliminate the first. We still have the picture of two
commands, one rescinding the other.
There is a more radical way of reading the Abraham story. This is to say
that while Abraham believed that he had been commanded to sacrifice his
son, he need not have been so commanded. Is there any basis for reading the
story this way-or for reading Kierkegaard's version of the story this way?
Certainly, at first glance, it does not seem that Johannes de Silentio reads the
story this way. He appears to treat the story "literally"-in the sense that it
involves two commands from God, the first "suspending the ethical" and the
second "giving back" Isaac. As he says: "The story of Abraham contains,
then, a teleological suspension of the ethical...If this is not Abraham's situation, then Abraham is not even a tragic hero but a murderer" (FT, 66.) If
such is not the case, then faith does not exist. Yet Johannes is also a poet who
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is given to imagining various possible scenarios, other ways in which the
story might have happened. In his hands, the story at times begins to take on
the character of a fairy tale. He is also exceedingly concerned lest anyone
take it upon himself to emulate Abraham (FT, 28f.) That he himself seems
uncertain whether Abraham did in fact receive such a command is indicated
by his worry that Abraham might have been mistaken (FT, 61.) The feature
that Johannes insists upon is that Abraham believed that God required such
a sacrifice of him. As it turned out, God did not require such a sacrifice. Thus
in this sense, Abraham's belief was "mistaken." He did, fortunately, come to
believe that he was not to sacrifice Isaac.
Is Johannes, is Kierkegaard, trying to caution us here against a "literal"
reading of the story? Might Abraham still serve as an exemplar of faith, even
though he was "mistaken" in thinking that God required him to take the knife
to his son? That Abraham possessed the "formal" qualifications of faith, i.e.
that he believed against the understanding, need not necessarily imply that
the 'what' of faith, at least with regard to the command to sacrifice Isaac,
was in fact correct. Anyone familiar with the writings of Kierkegaard will
surely call to mind here the "truth is subjectivity" thesis of the Postscript-a
thesis that is especially applicable to the account of faith at the level of
Religion A-of which Abraham would seem to be an exemplar. 47
My suggestion is that we read the story in the light of this thesis. There are
many difficulties raised by such a suggestion, not the least of which is that
without the first divine command the story of Abraham would no longer seem
to contain a "teleological suspension of the ethical." There is also
Kierkegaard's description of Abraham's conflict as a conflict of two divine
commands. There is finally his acceptance of the Bible as God's Word. The
second of these could be resolved by saying that this is how Kierkegaard sees
Abraham as understanding the conflict. Let us consider the other two in
reverse order. While Kierkegaard accepted the Bible as God's revelation, he
was obviously aware of the historical-critical approach and was not himself
a "literalist."48 Also he was not above, as we have seen, criticizing the Old
Testament and Jewish conception of God. In the Old Testament, God is seen
as "through a glass darkly." Only with God's revelation of Himself in Christ,
and even there He does not reveal Himself "immediately," do we have a full
expression of God's nature as Love, a "pattern" to guide us in our efforts to
become a subject in truth. It is also interesting to note the difference between
the double-movement of faith in Fear and Trembling and the Discourses. In
the latter, to expect something special, something particular, is said to be to
lack faith. Abraham, on the other hand, believes that he will get Isaac back.
Only in Fear and Trembling and in Repetition, where Job is the focal figure,
is faith described in terms of -receiving back the finite in a particular sense.
The emphasis on the particular in these works may be due to the fact that
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both focal figures were Jewish, and that they represented a life possibility
that needed to be presented as a part of his comprehensive project to map out
such possibilities. 49 They do represent in this sense a characteristic feature of
Judaism. 50 We have noted that it seems that Kierkegaard, while he was writing
Fear and Trembling, may very well have been struggling with this possibility,
the possibility that he might also get Regine back.
Kierkegaard's "struggle" here can be seen as representative of the "building" of faith or the "strengthening" of the inner man. One hopes, one prays
to God for some thing, for some possibility that might be granted by Him to
whom all things are possible. One's hope, one's wish, however, may be
denied. Yet, one may come to perceive this denial, and the whole world along
with it, as a gift from the hand of God. Only through such faith can one
receive back the whole of the temporal. This would seem to be import of the
picture of the ordinary knight of faith in Fear and Trembling (FT, 38f.) It is this
double-movement, the double-movement of the Discourses, rather than that
illustrated by Abraham, that is fundamental. In this sense, the "faith" of the
Discourses does seem to "go further" than that represented by Abraham. 51
The crucial difficulty with the reading that we have proposed is that the
story of Abraham would no longer seem to contain a "teleological suspension
of the ethical." Is the "suspension" involved that of God's acceptance of
Abraham's willingness to sacrifice his son, when such a sacrifice was not
literally required of him? One may certainly wonder if we have here not only
"gone further" than Abraham but also beyond Kierkegaard. 52 Indeed, one
might well wonder if we have not removed the "fear and trembling" from
Fear and Trembling. On this reading, the story in Genesis 22 would not
actually require a "teleological suspension of the ethical." Is not such a
reading, however, more consistent with the picture of God as unchanging
Love, the picture of God in the Discourses, than that of God as issuing and
rescinding commands?53 On this point, it is interesting to note what
Kierkegaard has to say in the Discourses about Abraham's pleading with God
to change his mind about punishing the citizens of Sodom and Gomorrah. To
speak of God in this way, as the Bible does, is said to 'speak humanly.'54
Could it be that the description of God as issuing and rescinding commands,
of finding out something he did not know before, is also to 'speak humanly'?
In short, is it that we ought not to read the story in Genesis 22 literally? Might
it be that the story can serve as an illustration of the "teleological suspension
of the ethical" and Abraham can remain an exemplar of faith without its being
taken "literally"?
While such a reading may be Kierkegaardian in spirit, I am not completely
convinced that it is Kierkegaardian in fact. Kierkegaard notes at one point in
the Discourses how what we see, especially in matters pertaining to the spirit,
depends on the seer. In our "rereading" perhaps we are "reading into" the
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text what we want to find there. Whether this is so, it seems that each reader
must decide for him or herself. Even so, such a reading still leaves us with
the possibility of "teleological suspensions of the ethical," with the possibility
of "conflicts" like those illustrated by the story of Abraham, and by
Kierkegaard's own situation. Indeed, that there can be such "conflicts" might
very well be seen as the moral of Fear and Trembling. In the final analysis,
the work does advocate the primacy of a religious ethic. Nor can we eliminate
the element of "fear and trembling" from the religious life. 55 The demand of
love and the "covering" of love must both be present. One must live with the
possibility that the demand of Love may conflict not only with our own
desires but also bring us into conflict with others and society.56 In this sense,
the "call to sacrifice," the first command, cannot be eliminated. Nor is there
any "objective" means of settling such "conflicts." Still, while one must walk
one's own path in "fear and trembling," one need not for Kierkegaard, thanks
to God's revelation in Christ, go one's way without a Pattern, or without Help.
College of William and Mary
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precisely this God-relationship of the individual which must put every established order
in suspense, so that God, at any instant He will, by pressure upon the individual has
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says elsewhere of Fear and Trembling: " ... but what a midrash it is! Only so gifted a writer
as Kierkegaard could call attention so effectively to the heart of the ancient tale missed
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position allows the term to designate a point of view adopted with reference to a particular
subject, such as a certain benevolent attitude toward God." In this sense, Abraham is said
to occupy a position and have a duty to obey God. Donnelly thus answers problem II in

216

Faith and Philosophy

the affirmative: There can be an absolute duty to God. On the other hand, problem I is
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position in the middle ages was that the patriarchs had a special command or revelation
from God, granting a dispensation from the commandments ... " (40).
46. Shalom Spiegel, The Last Trial, trans. by Judah Golding (New York: Behrman
House, 1967), 79.
47. This thesis is not just characteristic of Johannes Climacus. It can be found elsewhere
in both the pseudonymous and non-pseudonymous writings. Indeed, it seems to be present
already in some remarks of Judge William in Either/Or. On this point, see Earl McLane,
"Kierkegaard and Subjectivity," International Journal for Philosophy of Religion, 8
(1977),226-27.
48. See, e.g., his handling of the Adam and Eve story in The Concept ofAnxiety. The story
is not treated as an historical event but in terms of its human and religious significance.
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On this point, see also Bradley R. Dewey, "Kierkegaard and the Blue Testament," Harvard
Theological Review, 66 (1967), 391-409. In commenting upon the markings in one of
Kierkegaard's personal copies of the New Testament, he remarks: "Some of the Blue Testament
markings reveal that Kierkegaard employed a sharply critical eye while reading the text"
(397).
49. See particularly Malantschuk's book, especially parts I and II, for an excellent
account of the character and comprehensiveness of this project.
50. See JP, 1, #206 and especially JP, 2, #2223 where he describes a possibility that
he calls a "new" Fear and Trembling.
51. See ED DISC, I, 76, where he sees Paul's "faith" as going beyond that of Abraham.
52. While I have not been able to find explicit support in other interpreters for such a
reading, I might cite the following as possibly suggesting such a view. Robert Perkins
says: "The greatness of Abraham and his personal virtue and character lay in the fact that,
ambiguous though the command was, he was willing to obey it because he thought it was
from God." Kierkegaard's Fear and Trembling, ed. Perkins 55. See also Louis Jacobs,
"Traditions in Judaism and Christianity," in Outka and Reeder, Morality and Religion,
169: He agrees that God, being God, could not command a man to murder his son. "His
[Kierkegaard's] point is rather that if Abraham had been convinced that it was God's will
he would have done it because as 'knight of faith' his ultimate aim, unlike that of 'ethical
man,' is not subservience to the universal ethical norm but his individual relationship to
God." Such a reading would be closer to that usually taken in modern Biblical scholarship.
Generally, those elements in the story that seem to imply that God could demand such a
sacrifice are seen as a residue of a more primitive period of religious belief. Archaeological
investigations, e.g., have revealed that child sacrifice was practised at this time in Canaan.
(See Roland DeVaux, Ancient Israel, McGraw-Hill, New York, 1961,441-446.) Note also
that the primitive demand-'The first born of your sons you shall give to me' (Exodus
22:29) stands by itself in the text, though it is also emphasized elsewhere that-'Every
first-born son of man among your sons you shall redeem' (Exodus 13: 13). These factors
are said to explain how Abraham could have come to believe that God required Isaac as
a sacrifice. See Norman Gottwald, A Light unto the Nations (New York: Harper & Row,
1959), 254: "Any devout soul in that time [in Canaan] could have understood the divine
will as requiring of him the sacrifice of his dearest possession." See also The Interpreter's
Bible, 12 vols. (Nashville: Abingdon-Cokesbury, 1954),1645: "Abraham was not blessed
for correctness in conception of God's will; he was blessed because when he thought he
knew God's will he was willing to obey it to the limit." These "primitive" elements are
said to have been "re-edited" by a later writer-who emphasizes that the whole affair is
only a 'test.' See Nahum Sarna, Understanding Genesis (New York: Jewish Theological
Seminary of America, 1966), ch. IX. According to Gottwald, "The outcome of the story
gives a most emphatic rejection of child sacrifice while it respects and retains the intention
of the sacrifice: the giving of everything to God. Elohim accepts the intention in place of
the act" (254). (See also Spiegel 73.) Yet, while our interpretation of Kierkegaard would
be consistent with the above views, it must be admitted that such an account removes most
of the pathos from the story-and from Johannes' version. In contrast to Johannes account,
Abraham could have communicated with others about his ordeal and received consolationas he was carrying out a "common practice."

REREADING FEAR AND TREMBLING

219

53. The unchangeableness of God was a theme of the religious discourses from first to
last-from "Every Good and Perfect Gift" (ED DISC, I, 51-71) to "The Unchangeableness
of God" (1855) reprinted in Bretall, 469-482.
54. ED DISC, I, 75.
55. See Outka 205: "The kind of religious belief in Fear and Trembling exemplifies
par excellence the effects of bringing a being on the stage which is uniquely the object of
love and fear." One of the most beautiful expressions of this "double" element of the
religious life is the discourse "The Unchangeableness of God" (1855) cited earlier. There
he writes: "do you earnestly consider and sincerely strive to understand-and this is God's
eternally unchangeable will for you as for every human being, that you should sincerely
strive to attain this understanding-what God's will for you may be? .. How terrifying
then that He is eternally unchangeable'" (474). Yet, while "There is thus sheer fear and
trembling in this thought of the unchangeableness of God ... it is also true that there is rest
and happiness in this thought" (479). This "double" emphasis was present in
Kierkegaard's thought from first to last.

56. This is why prayer is so crucial for the religious life for Kierkegaard. For him,
" ... the true prayer-relationship does not exist when God hears what is being prayed about
but when the pray-er continues to pray until he is the one who hears, who hears what God
wills" (JP, 3, #3403). See Perry D. LeFevre, The Prayers of Kierkegaard (Chicago, IL:
The University of Chicago Press, 1956)-especially ch. 4.

